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Private Party Direct Access: A Comparison 
of the NAFfA and the EU Disciplines 
NOEMI GAL-OR* 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE RELEVANCE OF LOCUS STANDI FOR PRIVATE 
PARTIES IN NAFTA AND IN THE EU 
The right to bring an action and have standing (locus standi) in a 
legal dispute has become increasingly significant as the new world 
order unfolds into a web of treaties and agreements creating ever 
broader economic and political jurisdictional regimes. The territorial 
state gradually but consistently is making room for supranational enti-
ties to partake in a variety of affairs which, for the last three hundred 
years, were considered to be the state's absolute prerogative. At the 
same time, numerous voices are demanding that similar rights be 
accorded to individuals as well. The individual is understood to be 
more than a private person. Thus, the individual's welfare is embodied 
in the notion of "public interest." This broader aspect of communalism 
needs to be taken into consideration as lawmakers create policies, the 
effects of which are no longer just local, but regional and international 
as well.1 Universally noted, as human rights and environmental policy 
advocates continue to remind policymakers and legislators, the drafters 
of large and complex international economic institution-establishing 
treaties have largely ignored the role to be played by individuals and 
non-state actors in general. Yet, in reference to the European Commu-
*University College Professor of Political Science, Kwantlen University College. BA., Tel Aviv 
University, 1974; Ph.D. (Political Science), Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, 
1982; LL.B. Candidate, University of British Columbia. Professor Gal-Or wishes to acknowledge 
Jeffrey Thomas, Ladner Downs, Vancouver, and Professors John F. Murphy and Anthony Arnull 
for their important and helpful comments. 
1 Denise Manning.Cabrol, The Imminent Death of the Calvo Clause and the Rebirth of the Calvo 
Principle: Equality of Foreign and National Investors, 26 LAw & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 1169, 1169-99 
(1995). Manning.Cabrol discusses the significance of the Calvo Doctrine in a world "trilaterally 
owned" (my interpretation) by supranational organizations, individuals, and states. See id. Equal 
treatment of states and individuals is currently on the agenda, a sort of remodelling of the Calvo 
Doctrine of equality of foreigners and nationals which appears to have become part of regional 
law. See id. at 1172 n.15, 1180. 
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nities, Lord Gordon Slynn, a European Court of Justice (ECJ) judge, 
devoted a whole chapter to the question of how the European legal 
order created by the Treaty of Rome (hereinafter Treaty) 2 affects the 
people. In this chapter, Lord Gordon Slynn stated that "[i]t is plain 
that many of the steps taken to bring about a common market or a 
single market will have an effect on the lives of people. "3 Indeed, the 
European Union (EU) attests to a history of recognition of the right 
of non-state actors to exercise some direct control over how the Com-
munity affects their rights. While the North American Free Trade 
Agreement4 (NAFTA) has followed suit, it is still many steps behind the 
EU example. 
The post-war period has seen international law and the international 
legal process move away from the traditional approach under which 
states alone were able to avail themselves of international legal reme-
dies. In its place, a new approach has emerged (at least in certain 
areas) in which individuals may also be the subjects of international 
law and, therefore, may participate in the international legal process. 
Among the primary examples of this evolution are the Nuremberg 
Trials and the post-war expansion of the international human rights 
movement. The development, however, occurred principally in the 
area of individual and collective human rights.5 This separation be-
tween human rights and the rights of the individual in other areas, 
2TREATY EsTABLISHING THE EuROPEAN EcoNOMIC CoMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 
ll (1958) [hereinafter EEC TREATY]; TREATY ESTABLISHING A SINGLE CouNCIL AND A SINGLE 
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Apr. 8, 1965, OJ. (L 152) 1 (1965), 41.L.M. 776 
[hereinafter Merger Treaty]. For simplification, reference will be to the European Union (EU) 
as a generic term (which includes the three founding treaties: the two sectoral treaties of the 
European Coal and Steel Community, TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL 
COMMUNITY, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter ECSC]; TREATY ESTABLISHING THE 
EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY CoMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957,298 U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter Euratom]; 
and the EEC TREATY, (the latter two treaties which are known collectively as the Treaty of Rome); 
SINGLE EuROPEAN AcT,july 1, 1987, OJ. (L 169) 1 (1987), 2 C.M.L.R. 741 (1987), 251.L.M. 503 
[hereinafter SEA]; TREATY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, OJ. (C 224) 1 (1992), [1992] 
1 C.M.L.R. 719 [hereinafter TEU or Maastricht]; the Protocols, and the Statutes. Specific refer-
ence will be made where required. 
3 GoRDON SLYNN, INTRODUCING A EUROPEAN LEGAL ORDER 85, (1992). 
4 The North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U .S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 605 
(1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
5 SeeL.C. GREEN, LAw AND SociETY 241-82 (1975); Nkambo Mugerwa, Subjects of International 
Law in MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 249, 260-66 (Max Sorensen ed. 1968), [herein-
after Mugerwa]; Oda Shigeru, The Individual in International Law in MANUAL OF PuBLIC INTER-
NATIONAL LAw 469-530 (Max Sorensen ed. 1968) [hereinafter Shigeru]; DINSTEIN YORAM, THE 
INTERNATIONAL NoN-NATIONAL LAW (1979) (author's translation). 
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such as trade, is artificial. As early as the beginning of the 20th century, 
individuals have been entitled to bring direct claims for infringements 
on their rights, especially property rights, before international tribu-
nals.6 
Observations made almost thirty years ago about the shortcomings 
of the status of the individual person as a subject of international law 
are still valid today. When considering the individual as an actor in 
international trade, the following explanation continues to apply: 
[t]he position of the individual as the subject of international 
law [is] greatly obscured by a failure to distinguish between 
the recognition of rights enuring to the benefit of the indi-
vidual and the enforceability of these rights at his instance. 
The fact that the beneficiary is incapable of taking inde-
pendent steps in his own name to enforce them does not 
signifY that he is not a subject of the law or that the rights in 
question are vested exclusively in the agency which possesses 
the capacity to enforce them. 7 
This contention has been strengthened by the recognition of the in-
tertwining relationship between foreign and domestic policies. 8 When 
concluding international agreements, governments enter into commit-
ments which inevitably, and more often than not, deliberately modifY 
the domestic relationship between state and citizen. Of great signifi-
cance, especially concerning representative democracies, is the fact 
that by creating international legal regimes (e.g., trade, security, cul-
ture), governments bind their citizens to laws. The citizens, however, 
play an extremely limited role in the creation of these laws.9 As issues 
affecting the lives of citizens increasingly evolve outside the domestic 
sphere, non-state actors' control over their lives ("public participa-
tion") diminishes proportionally. There are two aspects to this deficit. 
First, the ensuing weakening of representative democratic institutions 
is exacerbated by the fact that, in practice, civil rights can be compen-
6 See Shigeru, supra note 5, at 5ll-l3. 
7 Mugerwa, supra note 5, at 318. 
8 Henry A. Kissinger, Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy in INTERNATIONAL PoLITICS AND 
FoREIGN PoLICY 261, 261-63 Qames N. Rosenau ed. 1969). 
9 The European Parliament (EP), which is a unique international representative institution of 
citizens within a multilateral legal area, is an exception to the rule although it cannot be parred 
with any known model of a representative-democratic national legislature. It has attracted criti-
cism for failing to effectively represent the cause of the European citizen, and consequently 
tainting the European Union with the so-<:alled "democratic deficit." 
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sated for by the possession of economic might. In this process, eco-
nomic inequality undermines formal legal equality. "Big business" eas-
ily exerts leverage within national and international systems in ways 
unavailable to ordinary persons, small businesses, and non-profit, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). 
Second, international lawmaking through inter-governmental agree-
ments only unsystematically and partially harmonizes law among the 
signatory states. Consequently, different domestic laws providing for 
varying degrees of access to justice bind citizens in different countries 
belonging to the same international legal regime. This results in varied 
access to justice. Thus, as a corollary to new rights and obligations, in-
ternational lawmaking indirectly produces inequality before the law. 10 
Despite having set a progressive example to counter such effect, great-
er individual access should be granted in both the NAFTA and EU 
contexts as both of these institutions continue to evolve. 
Under the regime of international trade agreements, what protec-
tion is extended to the aggrieved private party? Where does the ordi-
nary person turn in seeking remedy to i~ustice? Is direct access to 
justice accorded and if so, how is the dispute resolution process acti-
vated and the settlement enforced? 
In answering these questions, this article will study the subject of 
locus standi of non-state actors within the dispute resolution regimes 
established by the EU and NAFTA. 11 While NAFTA addresses this issue 
on a sectoral basis, the EU considers it an institutional and constitu-
tional matter. The purpose of this article is to juxtapose the different 
approaches and their solutions to the issue of protecting the rights of 
private parties under the two regional arrangements. The first part of 
this article will discuss the nature of the two agreements, comparing 
NAFTA, a regional agreement without institutions, to the EU, an en-
10 It should be noted, however, that in the European case a major part of the European 
Community's (EC) legislative activity is concerned with the harmonization of the laws of the 
Member States. There is a large body of case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) designed 
to reduce the problem of varying degrees of access to justice in the Member States. More 
specifically, the ECJ has been very explicit in recognizing that the protection of fundamental 
human rights is an integral part of the EC's "new legal order" and has developed its own 
jurisprudence of human rights, drawing on the European Convention on Human Rights and the 
constitutional traditions of Member States. 
11 "As we shall see, the question of locus standi is a matter of policy as well as law, and it is 
necessary to protect the individual against illegal acts of the Community institutions as well as it 
is to safeguard the efficiency of decision-making," and is the cardinal question also with regard 
to the NAFTA situation. See Nanette A.E. Neuwahl, Article 173 Paragraph 4 EC: Past, Present and 
Possible Future, 21 EuR. L. REv. 17, 19 (1996). 
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terprise in regional integration equipped with powerful and authori-
tative institutions. Second, this article will elaborate on the concept of 
"private party" and will review the choice of dispute resolution mecha-
nisms. Third, this article will explore the distinction between direct 
and non-direct access, since the main challenge to the private party's 
right to remedy arising from the inter- and supra-national arrange-
ments lies in this particular detail. Fourth, this article will analyze the 
private party direct access to dispute resolution in NAFTA. Most rele-
vant to this analysis is the NAFTA Chapter 11, Section B, which deals 
with dispute resolution regarding investments and the investor's right 
of direct access. 12 Dispute resolution and private party direct access in 
the EU requires a general discussion of the EU court system and, in 
particular, of Article 173 ( 4) of the Treaty of the European Union.13 In 
conclusion, this article highlights the different approaches to private 
party direct access under NAFTA and the EU. 
II. THE NAFTA: A REGIONAL AGREEMENT WITHOUT INSTITUTIONS 
The primary purpose of NAFTA is to assist the North American 
region in becoming more economically competitive with the rest of 
the world. NAFTA is an international commitment made by the United 
States, Canada, and Mexico which sets forth rules concerning trade, 
investment, and the provision of services. The continuity and certainty 
that NAFTA provides enables each nation to allocate its resources 
optimally in the region; as a result, the region, as a whole, will become 
more competitive in the world economy. 14 
NAFTA represents a market of 379 million people with $6.5 trillion 
in production.15 The impetus behind NAFTA was the establishment of 
a free trade area. 16 Despite being a trilateral, but open, economic 
agreement of defined and limited scope aimed at increasing interna-
tional trade through the elimination of trade barriers, NAFTA's found-
12 SeeNAFfA, supra note 4, arts. 1101-1110. 
I~SeeTEU, art. 173(4). 
14Jaime Jose Serra Puche, Secretary of Commerce and Industrial Promotion for Mexico, A 
Source of Competitiveness, Speech delivered before the Economic Club of Detroit (December 9, 
1992) in ONE WoRLD, MANY VOICES 233, 233-34 (Glenn Hastedt ed. 1995). 
15 Jonathan I. Miller, Comment, Prospects for Satisfactory Dispute Resolution of Private Commercial 
Disputes Under the North American Free Trade Agreement, 21 PEPP. L. REv. 1313, 1315 (1994). 
16 Id. at 1314-15. In comparison, the EU was formed to create a customs union. Frederick M. 
Abbott, The North America Free Trade Agreement and Its Implications for the European Union, 4 
TRANSNAT'L L. & CoNTEMP. PRoBs. 119, 119-57 (1994) [hereinafter Abbott I]; 
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ing members have not committed themselves to relinquishing their 
sovereignty to the same extent as the EU Member StatesP 
The comparatively modest goal of NAFfA explains its institutional 
meagerness. In addition, the decision to establish a free trade area 
rather than a customs union directly affected the choice of remedies 
available to the individual private party. Chapter Twenty of NAFfA 
establishes NAFTA's institutions. 18 The trilateral cabinet level Free 
Trade Commission19 oversees the implementation of the agreement, 
makes recommendations regarding further elaboration, supervises the 
work of the various committees and working groups established under 
the agreement, and resolves disputes regarding interpretation and 
application. 20 It is aided by the Secretariat, an administrative body 
comprised of national officers in each Member State and funded for 
its operation by the relevant government.21 The Secretariat assists the 
Free Trade Commission and its working groups and committees, and 
plays a role in the operation of the dispute settlement procedures 
under Chapters Eleven, Nineteen, and Twenty.22 Although fulfilling 
important administrative roles, neither institution has the decision-
making power to bind any of the Parties to NAFfA. Thus, NAFfA does 
not provide for a legislative body, nor does it provide for a judiciary to 
settle disputes arising under it. Moreover, NAFTA is non-self-executing 
for the United States since the congressional implementing legislation 
denies it direct effect. 23 It is non-self-executing for Canada as well. 24 
This means that the treaty cannot be invoked in national courts as the 
legal basis for a cause of action. Mexico is the only member among the 
three to directly incorporate NAFfA within its nationallaw. 25 
17 Chile has been in membership negotiations with both the Mercosur and NAFTA nations, 
and recently concluded a free trade agreement with Canada. 
18 NAFTA, supra note 4, arts. 2001, 2002. 
19Jd. 
20 Id. at art. 2002. The list of these committees and working groups is set forth in Annex 2001.2. 
Jd. at art. 2001.2. 
21 Id. at art. 2002. 
22 RoBERT K. PATERSON, MARTIN M.N. BAND,JocKA. FINLAYSON &JEFFREYS. THOMAS, INTER-
NATIONAL 'TRADE AND INVESTMENT LAw IN CANADA (2d ed. 1994) (hereinafter PATERSON]; Abbott 
I, supra note 16, at 121. 
23 See Abbott I, supra note 16, at 122. 
24 NAFTA Implementation Act, ch.44, 1993 S.C. 1921 (Can.). 
25 See generally Symposium, Litigation, Arbitration, and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 4 LoY. L.A. 
INT'L & CoMP. LJ. 986, 987 (1993) (presentation of Julio C. Trevino, citing Article 133 of the 
Federal Constitution of Mexico); Maureen Appel Molot, The North American Trade Agreement: 
Policy or Investment Led? in WESTERN HEMISPHERE TRADE INTEGRATION: A CANADIAN-LATIN 
DIALOGUE 187 (Richard G. Lipsey & Patricio Meller, eds. 1997). 
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NAFTA's founding Member States had no intention of delegating 
lawmaking powers to any new institutional arrangement. Guided by 
political determination to avoid both the establishment of suprana-
tional institutions and the extension of a private right of action, the 
NAFTA drafters decided (1) to limit institutional aspects to minimal 
independent powers26 and (2) to sidestep a formal dispute settlement 
process.27 The ensuing relative institutional amorphism (compared to 
the EU and to the structure of the State) reflects the preference for 
decentralized over centralized integration.28 While creating a free trade 
area for its three Member States, in the absence of strong supranational 
legal and adjudicatory institutions, NAFTA ultimately leaves the "play-
ing field" to the discretion of the national legal institutions and pro-
cesses of each of the Member States. The obligation to follow the rules 
and the spirit of NAFTA is thus largely placed upon the individual 
governments, rather than being shared in a partnership among the 
Member States. 
Had the NAFTA negotiators pursued a more expansive vision and 
mandate, other elements would have captured the attention of the 
signatories. NAFTA, however, focuses only on economic free trade and 
not on integration, and ignores related social, cultural, and political 
aspects. Although free trade is expected to lead to integration, NAFTA 
did not create mechanisms to deal with such subsequent develop-
ments. While the EU's theory recognizes that the free movement of 
goods, services, capital, and intellectual property must be supplement-
ed by the free movement of people, NAFTA's conception remains very 
reserved in this respect. NAFTA's main references to social issues are 
found in the labor side agreement,29 and by inference in the environ-
mental side agreement.30 The labor side agreement, however, is a 
minimalist arrangement. NAFTA's scant provisions are striking, espe-
cially when contemplating the immense social and political implica-
tions that will emerge once the allowance for and regulation of an 
internal NAFTA free trans-border movement of people becomes eco-
nomically compelling. 
26 SeeR. Jeffrey Kelleher, NAFTA and the European Union Comparison and Contrast, 2 SAN DIEGO 
JusT. J. 19, 25 (1994). 
27 See id. 
28 Abbott I, supra note 16, at 122-23. 
29 See NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON LABOR CoOPERATION, Sept. 14, 1993, U.S.--Can.-Mex., 
321.L.M. 1499 (entered into force jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAALC]. 
SO See NORTH AMERICAN AGREEMENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION, Sept. 14, 1993, U.S.-
Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 1480 (entered into force jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAAEC]. 
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NAFTA does not provide for a human rights charter, and fails to 
address social issues associated with equality. NAFTA's underlying as-
sumption-and expectation-is that social benefits will ensue from the 
distribution of economic benefits, and that the pursuit and manage-
ment of such benefits are separate from the latter and should remain 
in the hands of the responsible governmentsY As will be seen later, 
NAFTA's coverage of a narrow spectrum of trade-related issues restricts 
its attention to only certain types of disputes. While other types of 
disputes may arise, NAFTA's limited scope will prevent them from 
being addressed. 
III. THE EU: REGIONAL INTEGRATION WITH CENTRALIZED 
INSTITUTIONS 
The European Communities32 are no longer merely a supranational 
organization embracing fifteen Member States joined together by in-
ternational agreements. Evolving to form a unique system, the Member 
States created a "new legal order" of Community law,33 separate and 
distinct from both the international and the national legal tradition. 
To enjoy the benefits of this order, Member States have further agreed 
to limit their sovereign rights and even allowed their nationals to join 
this new legal regime as its subjects. "The TEU introduces a-some-
what vague-concept of European citizenship . . . , a constitutional 
recognition of citizenship to the pre-Maastricht economic focus of 
individual rights."34 
The EU represents the current stage of integration of the so-called 
Western European countries. The EU had its origins in the aftermath 
of the Second World War with six founding members that grew to 
number fifteen. The original purpose of the EU was to explore and 
31 Abbott I, supra note I6, at I28-29. 
32The European Union has been referred to as the "Common Market," the "European Com-
munities" and the "European Community." Dinnage and Murphy draw attention to the problem 
of nomenclature in the European integrative process. See]AMES D. DINNAGE &JoHN F. MuRPHY, 
THE CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw OF THE EuROPEAN UNION 4 (I996). They caution that "[t]he study of 
this subject therefore may perhaps be likened to the study of an unusual amorphous shape. At 
any moment it may be possible to describe it, assign a color or a weight to it and so on." See id. 
33 An earlier characterization of the European Community as a "new legal order of international 
law," from the Van Gend en Loos case, has now been largely superseded by reference in the ECJ's 
opinion in Costa to a "new legal order," without any reference to international law. See Case 26/62, 
Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Beiastingen, I963 E.C.R. I, [I963] C.M.L.R. 
I05; Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, I964 E.C.R. 585, [1964] C.M.L.R. 425. 
34 Fabian Amtenbrink, Public Interest Litigation before European Courts, 7 EuR. Bus. L. REv. 35, 
35 (I996). 
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experiment with various strategies of cooperation and collaboration in 
an effort to avoid the recurrence of war among the Member States. 
Unlike NAFTA, the raison d'etre of the EU consisted of ensuring secu-
rity and peace in Europe. Economic considerations, as important as 
they were to the reconstruction of Europe, were seen as providing the 
best available means to achieve this goal. In Winston Churchill's words, 
the "United States of Europe" was designed to "recreate the European 
family, or as much of it as we can, and provide it with a structure under 
which it can dwell in peace, in safety and in freedom. "35 European 
integration thus consisted of two premises completely impertinent to 
the negotiators of the NAFTA: (1) the existence of a commonality of 
values and cultural heritage to cement close cooperation, and (2) the 
need for political stability to ensure such cooperation. The European 
edifice was thus constructed around three treaties,36 the core institu-
tions of which were later to merge into a single institution. In the 
course of its development, the supranational and confederate organi-
zation expanded in membership and deepened in content. It has put 
in place a European social order comprised of the following: ( 1) the 
free movement of labor, (2) common competition rules with an en-
forcement mechanism, (3) a plan to unify working conditions, ( 4) a 
common environmental regime, (5) rules for approximation of tech-
nical standards, (6) transfer payments to equalize regional develop-
ment, and (7) "even transfer payments to assist the French family 
farmer."37 
The structural foundation of the EU consists of four institutions: the 
Assembly (European Parliament), the Council (of Ministers), the Com-
mission (the administrative bureaucracy), and the Court of Justice. 
This structure emulates, to a certain degree, the institutional structure 
of the liberal democratic nation-state. While only gradually and reluc-
tantly diminishing the sovereignty of their Member States, the Euro-
pean Treaties empowered the EU's institutions to make binding deci-
sions upon the Member States, institutions, and individuals. Other EU 
bodies possess only advisory powers. 38 
The most important decision-making institution of the EU is the 
Council ofthe European Union (hereinafter Council).39 In accordance 
35P.S.R.F. MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE TO EuROPEAN CoMMUNITY LAw 6 (4th ed. 1985). 
36 See generally EEC TREATY, supra note 2; ECSC, supra note 2; Euratom, supra note 2. 
37 Abbott I, supra note 16, at 129. 
38 MATHIJSEN, supra note 35, at 11. 
39 The Council was formerly known as the Council of Ministers. See MATHIJSEN, supra note 35, 
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with the strategy of pursuing peace and stability in Europe via eco-
nomic integration, the European Treaties went beyond the creation of 
a European customs union by expanding integration through the 
gradual harmonization of the Member States' economic policies. The 
Council,40 which consists of representatives41 of the Member States, is 
entrusted with ensuring the coordination of the general economic 
policies of the Member States. Being an institution and not merely an 
inter-governmental organization, the Council is expected to act in the 
interest of the EU.42 It exercises decision-making power by producing 
three types of rules: regulations, directives, and decisions. These rules 
resemble legislation43 and are limited by the provisions of the EEC 
Treaty. Unlike the Council, the Commission plays a law enforcement 
(executive) role by issuing regulations and directives, and making 
decisions at the administrative level.44 It is important to note that one 
of the unusual characteristics of the EU is that there is no clear 
separation of legislative and executive powers among EU institutions 
like that found in the United States. Nevertheless, the distinction 
between the rules, whether legislative or executive, is of crucial impor-
tance to private party access to EU dispute resolution.45 
The legal order created in the European Treaties established the EU 
court system, ~hich has significantly influenced the development of 
European law. This court system deals with disputes between Member 
States, between Member States and EU institutions, between the insti-
tutions themselves, between individuals and Member States, and be-
tween individuals and institutions.46 The ECJ issues judgments only 
at 15-67. The Commission is the other decision-making body. /d. The EP is an advisory and 
supervisory institution entrusted mainly with the power of recommendation. /d. While not a 
legislative body, and its powers not yet approximating those of a national parliament, after the 
Maastricht Treaty's introduction of the so-called co-decision procedure (Article 189(b)), the EP 
has finally acquired a (admittedly limited) legislative role. See Maastricht, art. 189(b). This body, 
however, is of secondary relevance to the subject of the present article. 
40 In addition to the Council, since 1975, the "European Council"-a forum of Heads of State 
or Government-meets three times a year to issue general guidelines to be acted upon by the 
Council and the Commission. See MATHIJSEN, supra note 35, at 41-43. 
41 Council meetings are normally attended by the Member States' Ministers whose portfolios 
cover the subject under discussion. 
42 See MATHIJSEN, supra note 35, at 28, 29. 
43 Albeit the acts are not grounded in a popular and representative legitimacy basis. 
44 The basic principle of "conferred powers" also applies, with few exceptions, with regard to 
Commission decision-making circumscribed by the provisions of the Treaty. MATHIJSEN, supra 
note 35, at 47-48. 
45 See infra section VI. 
46 SLYNN, supra note 3, at 6. 
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when it is called upon to do so.47 It interprets EU rules by reference to 
their objective and consequently states the law when not explicitly 
provided for in the existing legislation.48 One of the chief challenges 
of the ECJ lies in the fact that it deals with international economic law 
which is constantly evolving and requires frequent adaptation of am-
biguously drafted treaties.49 The establishment of the European Court 
of First Instance (CFI) 50 introduced a partition of the judiciary, where-
by the CFI hears in first instance certain categories of cases, including 
all cases brought by natural or legal persons.51 The ECJ still hears a 
range of direct actions and is exclusively empowered to address pre-
liminary rulings and actions by Member States or EU institutions.52 
Most importantly, this restructuring created a bifurcated jurisdiction, 
entrusting the ECJ with the new appellate role of reviewing lower CFI 
decisions on points of law.53 The EU court system along with the 
national court system are the fora in which private persons enjoy direct 
access for the settlement of disputes governed by EU law. 
IV. THE DEFINITION OF PRIVATE PARTY 
As economic globalization expands and the world economy aligns 
into regional trade blocks, social problems, which traditionally were 
controlled and managed within the individual state, are now acquiring 
a regional existence and are becoming subject to intra- and inter-re-
gional relations. The concern is that without both effective enforce-
ment of existing obligations as well as avenues for public participation, 
neither the removal of trade barriers, nor the enhancement of recip-
rocal national treatment will produce the results expected by the foun-
ders of regional trade blocks. 54 Unfortunately, this problem represents 
47 See id. 
48 See id. 
49 See MATHIJSEN, supra note 35, at 55. 
50 See SEA, art. 32(d); Neville Brown, The First Five Years of the Court of First Instance and Appeals 
to the Court of justice: Assessment and Statistics, 32 CoMMON MKT. L. REv. 743, 743-44; TIMOTHY 
MILLETT, THE CoURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 6-7 (1990). For a 
discussion on the jurisdiction of these courts, see infra section V. Members of the courts are chosen 
from persons whose independence is beyond doubt and with appropriate judicial qualifications, 
and are appointed by common accord of the Member States' governments. The number has 
increased over the years. 
5! See Brown, supra note 50, at 743-44; MILLETT, supra note, 50, at 6-7. 
52 See Brown, supra note 50, at 743-44; MILLETT, supra note, 50, at 6-7. 
53 See Brown, supra note 50, at 743-44; MILLETT, supra note, 50, at 6-7. 
54 See]. Scott Bodie, The NAFTA's Institutions and Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: A Case for 
12 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. XXI, No. 1 
only the economic aspect of private party access to litigation. Broader 
in scope is the worry that: 
Problems associated with the phenomenon of social dump-
ing loom, in my view, as the major trade-related issue of the 
next decade-more likely to give rise to serious popular dis-
satisfaction and intergovernmental conflict than issues with 
respect to the environment .... This is an area of concern 
which we may therefore usefully begin to address from the 
standpoint of comparative regional systems. 55 
Social stability within the new economic and political world order is 
contingent upon popular approval of the economic, particularly trade, 
arrangements. The revolutionary transformations of both national and 
international economic processes and structures have generated great 
economic and social insecurity in the individual person. Such worries 
can be alleviated if individuals are guaranteed the existence and access 
to remedies for injustice. Consequently, socio-political stability, a con-
dition of economic growth, depends to a large extent on equal private 
party access to justice during both the period of restructuring and 
upon its completion. 
As the systems change, so do the actors within these systems. The 
question of who is a private party thus parallels the concern about 
social stability, and imposes some conceptual difficulties. The EU ver-
nacular distinguishes between "public/privileged" and "non-privileg-
ed/private" applicants.56 The private party, whether representing a 
public or a truly private interest, 57 encompasses all that is non-state and 
non-EU institutions.58 Under the category of the so-called "non-privi-
leged/private" party, the EU further discerns, in the words of the TEU, 
Public Participation (1994) (unpublished L.L.M. thesis, University of British Columbia). Of 
particular concern are the results expected to happen through the mechanism of comparative 
advantage. See id. 
55 Abbott I, supra note 16, at 129, 130. 
56 See Carol Harlow, Towards a Theory of Access for the European Court of Justice, 12 YB. EuR. L. 
213, 214 (1992). I will use the terms "individual" and "private party" interchangeably throughout 
the article. Much of the discussion on the identity/nature of the private party revolves around 
the notion of public interest and its representation as a stage in the evolution of administrative 
law and the legal issues it raises. 
57 For an article discussing public interest, private interest, and Community interest, see Amten-
brink, supra note 34. 
58 For a more detailed description, including the problem of defining the "individual" or 
"private party," seeA.G. TOTH, 1 LEGAL PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS IN THE EUROPEAN CoMMU-
NITIES 99 (1978). 
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between "natural" and "legal" persons and accords them limited space 
for "individual action. "59 
According to accepted Western theory of corporate person-
ality, "natural" and "legal" persons are assimilated, the as-
sumption being that corporate bodies possess no "real" exist-
ence. In other words, legal personality is "merely a device of 
legal technique." For procedural purposes, it then seems in-
evitably to follow both that corporate bodies are identical in 
character to individuals and that they must possess the same 
procedural rights. Unincorporated groups possess no legal 
personality hence, it is assumed, no separate identity and no 
interest distinct from those of the individuals which comprise 
them. For standing purposes, groups are implicitly subsumed 
either in the rights of "natural" or of "legal" persons, the latter 
being ... equated with individuals. To summarize, legal per-
sonality and with it, right of access to the legal system, are 
premised on a dual fiction: that corporate entities as well as 
groups are wholly assimilable to individuals.60 
A private party may have several identities and forms.61 It may consist 
of an individual person, a small business, a multinational corporation, 
an interest group, or a class registered as an association. The financial 
and legal resources at the disposal of the private party may determine 
its nature.62 Accordingly, the legally unincorporated person may litigate 
as (1) an individual, (2) a "litigation coalition" representing a group 
of individuals coalescing for a particular ad hoc case and purpose, (3) 
a group that registered separate applications, but is heard as a joint 
case, ( 4) a "membership association" protecting a common mutual 
interest (e.g., staff associations, trade unions, consumer, and environ-
mental associations) either as intervenors or as plaintiffs, and (5) as 
"representative groups" acting only as intervenors in litigation for 
non-parties and claiming to represent the public interest.63 The "legal" 
person, however, must have "the necessary independence to act as a 
responsible body in legal matters. "64 This classification reflects the road 
59 See Harlow, supra note 56, at 230-31. 
60 See id. at 231. 
61 See id. 
62 See id. 
65 See id. at 241-42. 
64Case 18/74, Syndicat General du Personnel v. Commission, 1974 E.C.R. 933, 'l! 7; see also 
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EU law has travelled since its inception, gradually expanding to include 
social conflicts, in addition to economic issues, as important causes of 
action. Traditionally, the private party category was largely represented 
by natural persons and associations alleging economic violations and 
human rights abuses. These natural persons and associations had ac-
cess to the European Commission of Human Rights, which is not an 
institution of the EU. However, as Gerhard Bebr suggests: 
[t]he capacity of the legal personality to bring action depends 
on the national law: ... [S]ince the EEC Treaty is not lim-
ited to special economic sectors, although it differentiates 
amongst them, there was no need to develop a special con-
cept of enterprises as was necessary under the ECSC and 
Euratom Treaties (hereinafter Treaties).65 
The Treaties lack an EU notion of a legal person.66 When examining 
the capacity of a legal person to bring an action, the Court resorts to 
the relevant national law. 'Thus, the legal personality under national law 
is required to exercise the right of action, as provided for by the Trea-
ties. "67 
Since NAFTA addresses the issue of locus standi differently than the 
EU,68 it is difficult to find an explicit general reference to the nature 
of the private party. The private party is identified in his, her, or its 
trade capacity. Consequently, a private party is most clearly defined as 
an investor in Chapter Eleven, providing for private party direct access 
to arbitration in investment disputes between an investor and the host 
state. Article 1001 refers to investor of a Party, namely a private party 
only from among the Parties signatory of NAFTA, and defines the 
investor as " ... a Party or state enterprise thereof, or a national or an 
enterprise of such a Party, that seeks to make, is making or has made an 
investment. "69 It refers only to an investor of another Party, not to a 
Party's own investors. 70 In discussing the hierarchy of access to transna-
Anthony Arnull, Private Applicants and the Action for Annulment under Article 173 of the EC Treaty, 
32 CoMMON MKT. L. REv. 7, 12 (1995). 
65 GERHARD BEBR, DEVELOPMENT OF jUDICIAL CoNTROL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 32 
(1981) [emphasis added]. 
66 See id. 
67 See id. 
68 The EU set the conditions for standing at the outset, in the TEU, whereas NAFI'A addresses 
these conditions as it proceeds sector-by-sector, and in Chapter Twenty, when addressing the 
dispute resolution mechanisms. See TEU, art. 173(4); NAFI'A, supra note 4, ch. 11. 
69NAFfA, supra note 4, art. 1001. 
70PATERSON, supra note 22, at 3.7(a) (i). 
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tional justice under the NAITA, however, private party appears to 
mean "an individual (or non-governmental organization) residing in 
a NAITA party,"71 who must not be a national of any of the Parties. 
This is an interesting point for comparison with the EU. Within the 
EU, subjects of EU law are primarily nationals of the Member States 
although " ... nationality of, or residence or establishment within, a Mem-
ber State is not in every case a necessary prerequisite for bringing 
private persons within the scope of Community law."72 In fact, nation-
ality or residence has no bearing on standing under Article 173, as the 
dumping cases illustrate. 73 
Furthermore, the private party is defined according to the sectoral 
subject matter of the dispute. Hence, a private party can take the form 
of an intellectual property right (IPR) holder, an enterprise engaged 
in NAFTA trade, or an association representing a social interest in the 
environment, labor, or other social cause. From the definitional point 
of view, therefore, no fundamental difference exists between the mean-
ing of "private person" in the EU compared with NAFTA law. 
The nature of the private party is of cardinal importance to the 
party's ability to access justice.74 Availability of financial resources to 
bring and sustain legal action is a determinant factor distinguishing a 
large multinational corporation, such as IBM, from smaller groups, 
such as the Pulp, Paper and Woodworkers of Canada and the self-em-
ployed desk-top publisher. These three types of private parties also 
diverge in their ability to engage effectively in political lobbying to 
advance their cause when a dispute arises. Furthermore, larger and 
more powerful private parties, such as corporations, enjoy greater 
access to available remedies. 75 It follows that the formalization of access 
processes by the creation of formalized institutions is the key to neu-
tralizing the interference of economic factors with the operation of 
justice. This is crucial to securing a just dispute resolution process, and 
the equalization of the various types of private parties before the law. 
71 Robert F. Housman, Access to Transnational Justice under the NAFTA: Different Interests, 
Different Access, 88 PRoc. AM. Soc'v INT'L L. 531 (1994). 
72 ToTH, supra note 58, at 32 [emphasis added]. 
73 See Christopher Harding, Who Goes to Court in Europe? An Anarysis of Litigation against the 
European Community, 17 EuR. L. REv. 105, 120-22 (1992); Arnull, supra note 64, at 31-33; 
Amtenbrink, supra note 34, at 36. 
74 Miller, supra note 15, at 1313-17. 
75 See id. 
16 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXI, No. 1 
v. THE CHOICE OF REMEDY76 
As states pool their sovereign powers and join with other states in 
creating new institutions and organizations governed by new legal 
regimes, the extent of legal recourse traditionally available to the 
private person either erodes or is transplanted to new authorities. 
While the EU has developed the doctrines of "direct applicability" and 
"direct effect" to ensure that EU law is self-executing, the NAFTA 
negotiators, who were reluctant to pool sovereignty, resorted to non-
traditional/alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms.77 
In the domestic context, the choice of dispute resolution mecha-
nisms consists of legal action or a resolution procedure amenable to 
the parties to the dispute. ADR, however, is not yet the norm in the 
domestic context and much weight is placed on formal adjudication. 
Consequently, a perception prevails that private party access to the 
courts is of prime importance. As ADR evolves, litigation may perhaps 
lose its primacy and become less important as a recourse. Indeed, in 
contrast to the domestic realm, ADR has always been the norm in the 
area of international disputes. Since access to national courts has 
usually been barred for parties involved in international disputes, or 
has not carried much favor, "the only formal means of dispute resolu-
tion that find broad acceptance in the international context are those 
created by agreement of the parties."78 It is important to note, however, 
that since these Parties are governments of states, the private party is 
excluded from negotiations and determining the terms of the agree-
ment. The three main dispute resolution methods arising by agree-
ment are: (1) mediation, which is based on the process, but does not 
result in the issuance of a report or decision, (2) non-binding arbitra-
tion concluding with a non-compulsory decision, or (3) binding arbi-
tration.79 
76 The concern about choice of, and access to, remedy arises primarily in the non-<:ontractual 
state-to-party disputes. In contractual disputes, particularly in party-to-party disputes, the parties 
are at liberty to devise the provisions for dispute settlement by agreement. 
77 The fact that EU law is self-executing means that it is immediately applicable within domestic 
law and invocable by private parties (thus allowing for private party direct access in matters of 
EU law to the state's domestic courts). 
78 0. Thomas Johnson, Alternative Dispute Resolution in the International Context: The North 
American Free Trade Agreement, 46 SMU L. REv. 2175, 2175 (1995). 
79 See id. A discussion of the merits and shortcomings of the three ADR mechanisms is beyond 
the scope of this article. 
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Both the contrast between ADR and formal adjudication in interna-
tional disputes, and the question of preference and quality of justice 
do not arise only by analogy with domestic disputes. Rather, they result 
from the different nature of the regional legal regimes established by 
the EU and NAFTA. The EU departs from the norm governing inter-
national dispute resolution by incorporating a court system and a 
process of legal action embracing the domestic tradition. It thus adds 
to the option of "out of court" arrangements a tier which (1) is inde-
pendent of agreement by the disputing parties (either contractual or 
not), (2) can be invoked in the event of failure to reach such agree-
ment, and (3) is non-negotiable. It equalizes the parties before the law 
in a more formalized manner, adding a degree of certainty to the 
dispute resolution process. Thus, for the EU, court action ranks higher 
than ADR. It follows that access to the courts holds the promise of a 
"better quality of justice" than does access to ADR. The NAFTA argu-
ably does not share this perception. 
EU law recognizes three groups of actors: Member States, EU insti-
tutions, and individuals.80 This creates six different types of bilateral 
legal relationships which may arise between these actors, and which 
affect the legal position and protection of private persons under EU 
law.81 Four main bodies are responsible for the enforcement ofEU law: 
the national courts of the Member States, the Commission,82 the ECJ 
and the CFI,83 and the Ombudsman.84 
Accordingly, private parties have access to four forums in which they 
may obtain remedies, but only two of these forums, the CFI and the 
ECJ and the national courts, allow for litigation. The determination of 
which judiciary to use is neither easy nor clear, and depends upon 
80 See ToTH. supra note 58, at 33. 
81 See id. 
82 See EEC TREATY, art. 169. Article 169 provides for the complaint procedure to the Commis-
sion which is also open to private parties and indeed is most often used by them. See id. The 
Commission, unlike the national courts or the Community courts, cannot adjudicate. It prepares 
an opinion, which if not followed by the member-state (usually the party complained against), it 
may take the dispute to the Community court. This, however, falls squarely within the category 
of private party indirect access to the judicial institutions. See Bodie, supra note 54, at 207--08. 
83 The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), formerly the European Commission on 
Human Rights provides an additional non-EU avenue. This is only of secondary importance in 
the context of this article. For an analysis of the "division of jurisdiction" between the ECJ and 
the ECHR, see Michael O'Neill, The Expansion of the ECJ's Fundamental Rights Jurisdiction: A 
Recipe jfff Tensions with Strasbourg?IrusH LAw TIMES, July 1995, at 168. 
84 See TEU, art. 138(e). The Ombudsman created under the Maastricht Treaty, has the power 
only to create a report in response to an individual complaint. See id. As it is an institution falling 
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three different considerations.85 First, if a person is seeking the remedy, 
the EU court system is generally, but not exclusively, available for 
actions against EU institutions, as are the national courts, for actions 
against the Member States and individuals.86 Second, the purpose of the 
action is controlling. Generally, though not conclusively, if the individ-
ual challenges the legality of an institution's acts or seeks protection 
against an obligation or sanction imposed by such institution, the EU 
courts are the appropriate forum. 87 If the individual's purpose is to 
enforce rights arising from EU law, however, the national courts are 
available.88 Finally, a third distinction is drawn between directly effective 
and non-directly effective provisions. 89 The doctrine of "direct effect" was 
devised to allow the individual the option of proceeding against the 
Member State in the national court.9° For non-directly effective provi-
sions, the EU courts are not available in all cases, as the availability 
depends upon the particular European Treaty in question: 
All that can be said concerning the question when to use 
which avenue of remedies ... is that this is never a matter of 
choice: the road to the European Court is open only in those 
relatively few, individually defined cases where the Court has 
been given jurisdiction under the Treaties. In all other cases, 
the national courts may be available subject to their own 
jurisdictional rules and system of remedies which, of course, 
may vary from Member State to Member State. A harmoniza-
tion of national remedies in respect of Community provisions, 
however desirable this may seem, has not yet been attemp-
ted.91 
While the avenues available under EU law comprise both legal action 
and ADR means, the ultimate tool to guarantee the resolution of 
disputes is still litigation, although many disputes never reach this stage 
and are settled outside of this realm.92 
within the competence of the EP under Article 138(e) of the EC Treaty, it has no enforceability 
power. See id.; Bodie, supra note 54, at 204-{)5. 
85 See ToTH, supra note 58, at 106-{)7. 
86 See id. at 106. 
87 See id. 
88 See id. 
89 See id. at 107. 
9° See ToTH, supra note 58, at 107. 
91 /d. 
92 "The [ECJ] considers the case and delivers, not conciliation advice, not a report, not an 
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The drafters of NAFfA have consciously refrained from including 
formal adjudication as a dispute resolution mechanism. The means 
offered in the main agreement and its side agreements include arbi-
tration, consultation, mediation, and the issuance of reports. Unlike 
the complex matrix of acknowledged legal relationships in the EU, and 
in the absence of formal institutions, NAFfA primarily creates a state-
to-state obligation by which the private party is accorded an inferior 
status.93 
The resolution of international commercial disputes by arbitration 
has found much favor with critics and has gained NAFTN4 consider-
able support. Arbitration, provides all of the advantages of faster, 
cheaper, and more certain procedures, such as those often devised by 
the consenting parties.95 While the choice of law and the discretion of 
the process (it is not made public) are listed among the major benefits 
of arbitration,96 the tendency to compromise, inherent to this process, 
may be seen as a major disadvantage.97 Arbitration may be binding and 
non-binding, and NAFfA employs both types.98 NAFTA, however, util-
izes consultation or mediation as steps preceding arbitration.99 Once 
arriving at arbitration, NAFfA opts for the non-binding version.100 
NAFTA, however, provides for binding arbitration in two categories of 
disputes: (1) investment disputes between a Party and a private party 
of another Party (Chapter Eleven), and (2) disputes arising under the 
anti-dumping and countervailing duty laws involving private parties 
and another Party (Chapter Nineteen).101 
advisory opinion, but a judgment, binding on the litigating states. It is somewhat like the United 
States Supreme Court. The losing state might evade or drag its heels, but in the final analysis 
there is no question of disobedience." Kelleher, supra note 26, at 27. 
93 By definition, the NAITA choice of an alternate approach to dispute resolution does not 
necessarily imply that a qualitatively different resolution of the dispute and remedy to the injustice 
ensue as compared with the EU remedies. This is a subject deserving a thorough analysis which 
is beyond the scope of this article. 
94 NAITA is usually perceived as strictly a trade agreement. See Symposium, supra note 25, at 
986-96. As already mentioned earlier, the social implications of the trade arrangements have 
largely been ignored. 
95 For an elaborate discussion of the pros and cons of arbitration and mediation and the reasons 
and modes of employment by NAITA, see johnson, supra note 78, passim. 
96 See id. 
97 See id. at 2176. 
98 See id. at 2178. 
99 See johnson, supra note 78, at 2180. 
100 See id. at 2181. 
101 See id. at 2183. 
20 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. XXI, No. 1 
Flowing from the selection of available remedies is the choice of 
bodies to facilitate their administration in structure and in process. 
NAFTA does not provide for a court system. 102 The Free Trade Com-
mission (FTC) (Chapter Twenty) is the body entrusted with supervis-
ing NAFTA's implementation and resolving "disputes that may arise 
regarding its interpretation or application"103 and with governing the 
mediation process. 104 The drafters of the NAFTA arbitration procedure 
abstained from creating a permanent arbitration tribunal and elected 
the ad hoc tribunal. This tribunal, comprised of members from a roster 
selected in advance by consensus between the Parties, forms a pool of 
arbitrators as disputes arise. 105 The process, however, diverges depend-
ing upon the sectoral nature of the issue at dispute. 106 
VI. DIRECT VERsus NoN-DIRECT AccEss 
Both NAFTA and the EU are international arrangements which 
introduce new laws regulating the lives of the societies under their 
regimes. NAFTA, a conspicuously state-to-state agreement, leaves very 
little direct access available to private parties. Generally, individuals, 
both natural and legal, may find remedies to disputes arising from 
NAFTA mainly under the national law of their country. This arrange-
ment is important in two respects. First, in the absence of legal insti-
tutions under NAFTA, there is no international forum in which to 
bring complaints. For arbitration and mediation, and where the Parties 
are bound by the provisions, NAFTA adheres to the rules of the Inter-
national Centre for the Settlement oflnvestment Disputes (ICSID),107 
ICSID's "Additional Facility,"108 and the 1957 United Nations Commis-
102 " ••• [T] he Working group continues to believe that the dispute settlement scheme of the 
NAFTA would be improved were there constituted a North American Trade Tribunal, the 
establishment of which was a key recommendation in its report." The Joint Working Group of 
the American Bar Association, the Canadian Bar Association, and the Barra Mexicana, Repart on 
Dispute Settlement Procedures in the Narth American Free Trade Agreement, 27 INT'L LAw. 831, 833 
(1993) [hereinafter Joint Working Group]. 
I03NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2001. 
104 See id. 
105 See id. at art. 2009. 
106 The majority of dispute resolution processes do not allow private party direct access or final 
binding resolution and are thus beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 4, 
art. 2021. 
107 As established by the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States 
and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter 
ICSID]. 
108 ICSID Additional Facility for the Administration of Conciliation, Arbitration and Fact-Find-
ing Proceedings, Doc. ICSID/11 (1979) [hereinafter ICSID Additional Facility]. 
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sian on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) .109 There is, however, 
only one sector, namely investment, dealt with in Chapter Eleven, 
where NAFTA explicitly provides for private party direct access and 
where these conventions are relevant. 110 In addition, NAFTA's Chapter 
Nineteen on anti-dumping and countervailing duty effectively provides 
for private party direct access.m Direct access, thus, largely remains a 
privilege reserved to the Parties to NAFTA, and hence, only indirectly 
to the nationals of the Parties. 112 
Second, since NAFTA is not a self-executing treaty in the United 
States or in Canada, 113 access to U.S. and Canadian law cannot be 
equated with access to the law of NAFTA. As the goals of NAFTA are 
narrowly focused on trade114 and not on the harmonization of laws 
designed to directly affect those operating in the market, 115 the focal 
subject of NAFTA is the Member State. The private party and direct 
access of private parties to remedies remain issues confined to the 
jurisdictions of each individual Member State. 
The outcome is therefore threefold. First, representation of non-
trade interests within the NAFTA forum is barred. Hence, although 
NAFTA may create trade-generated non-trade problems, it does not 
offer solutions. Second, given the economic disparity between big and 
small businesses, the absence of private party direct access results in 
inequality before the law, for the former can more readily compensate 
for lack of legal remedies through economic strength.116 Third, and 
perhaps of greatest concern, is the inequality between the private 
parties according to their nationality. In a dispute with another Party, 
Mexican private parties (and those residing in Mexico) have direct 
access to domestic remedies. In contrast, American private parties 
109 For purposes of enforcement, NAFTA recognizes the rules of the 1958 United Nations 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, june 10, 1958, 30 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention]; see NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 2022. 
no See infra part VII A. 
lll See infra part VII B. 
112 In the case of investment, direct access is also indirectly reserved to non-nationals of any of 
the Parties. 
113 Mexico is the only Party to incorporate NAFTA into its national laws. See Symposium, supra 
note 25, at 987 (Trevino presentation). 
ll4 Specifically, NAFTA's goals focus on the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade 
and on the establishment of reciprocal national treatment obligations concerning trade in 
services and investment. See NAFTA, supra note 4, pmbl. 
ns See Frederick M. Abbott, Integration Without Institutions: The NAFTA Mutation of the EC 
Model and the Future of the GATT Regime, 40 AM.]. CaMP. L. 917, 935-36 (1992) [hereinafter 
Abbott II]. 
ll6 See Miller, supra note 15, at 1318-20. 
22 BOSTON CoLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXI, No. 1 
involved in such disputes, do not enjoy direct access to the other Party's 
judiciary or to any of its other forms of ADR. Instead, they depend on 
the U.S. government to represent them before the other Member 
State. Yet, the indirect nature of the access is compensated for by the 
power of Section 301 of the U.S. trade law.117 Section 301 is applicable 
where the United States believes another trading partner is using 
offending trade measures or practices.U8 
The Section 301 process can be invoked in two ways: (1) by petition 
on the part of a party, or (2) upon the initiative of the U.S. Trade 
Representative, who considers the competing interests at issue that are 
allegedly harmed by unreasonable foreign trade practices. 119 Once 
initially approved, the petition proceeds through a set of hearings. 120 
If the petition is sustained, the Section 301 process concludes with 
mandatory U.S. retaliatory action for unjustifiable practices and viola-
tions of trade agreements121 and discretionary retaliatory action against 
such "non-unjustifiable" behavior.122 At the end of this open and public 
process, a government report, which can be further used by the private 
party to lobby its case, is issued. 123 
Consequently, American private parties are armed with a powerful 
tool of influence to lobby their government to protect their interests 
when they are involved in an international (including NAITA) dispute. 
While this does not represent direct access to remedy in the strict sense, 
for it requires the filing of a petition and subsequent action by the U.S. 
Trade Representative, it is a remedy nonetheless, accommodating the 
American party. This lobbying ability affords substantial protection to 
the American private party particularly when considering the relative 
sizes of the American, Canadian, and Mexican economies. Section 301, 
however, does not assist in compromising the international dispute, 
but rather escalates it, and in this sense, cannot be perceived as a just 
remedy. 
11719 u.s.c. § 2411. 
118 The section has been labelled as "aggressive unilateralism" because its operation enables the 
United States to defy unilaterally international obligations instead of resolving the underlying 
dispute through prescribed international avenues of dispute resolution. For a detailed analysis 
of Section 301, see THOMAS 0.-BAYARD & KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT, REciPROCITY AND RETALIATION 
IN U.S. TRADE POLICY (1994) [hereinafter BAYARD & ELLIOTT]. 
119 "Unreasonable" and "unjustifiable" were variably interpreted at the different evolutionary 
stages of Section 301. See id. at 29-31. 
I20 See BAYARD & ELLIOTT, supra note ll8, at 29-30. 
121 Presidential discretion may waive this provision. See id. at 45-49. 
122Jd. 
123 Jd. 
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In contrast, Canadian private parties do not have access to remedies 
comparable to those provided by U.S. section 301.124 Canadian private 
parties may only lobby their government. There is no open and public 
process available to the private party, nor must there be any report 
issued at the end of the lobbying effort. Thus, the private party may 
often be "kept in the dark" by a government refraining from providing 
reasons for its refusal to proceed with its case. In view of such an 
imbalance, the private party right to remedy under NAFTA is arguably 
of crucial importance to Canadians. 
Unlike NAFTA, the EU's goals encompass social, cultural, environ-
mental, and even political issues as part of the integration process. 
Embedded in a customs union, achievement of these goals is enhanced 
in the harmonization of trade law; enforceability is secured through 
the device of "direct effect," whereby individuals enjoy direct access to 
EU law via their national courts. The EU has thus been evolving into 
a quasi-federal legal system where "constitutional" judicial review and 
an appellate court system are available at the highest level, namely the 
ECJ. Due to a persisting lack of clarity separating the jurisdiction of 
the EU courts from the national courts, gaps in private party access to 
remedies still exist. These gaps can be bridged only by the private 
party's invocation of national litigation in order to gain indirectly 
access to the EU courts. 125 There remains, however, a large body of 
non-direct effect law which gives rise to disputes between individuals 
and EU institutions (and between Member States and institutions as 
well) that cannot be addressed in the national courts. In this area, 
there is only limited room available for direct access by private parties 
to EU legal recourse through EU institutions, including litigation for 
final judgment. 
In addition to providing EU dispute resolution institutions, access 
to EU remedies126 is determined according to the distinction between 
124 Nor do Canadians have the comparable access to NAFTA through local institutions available 
in Mexico. See Symposium, supra note 25, at 987 (Trevino presentation). 
125 These include the following EC treaty articles: Article 175 (action against inactivity); Article 
177 (b) (preliminary rulings concerning the legality of Community measures which has proven 
to be a fairly effective tool); Article 184 (defense of legality); Article 172 (appeals, for instance 
against fines); Articles 178 and 215(2) (regarding claims alleging non-contractual liability); 
Article 93(2) (appeals against decisions concerning state aids). See TREATY EsTABLISHING THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Feb. 7, 1992, OJ. (C 224) 1, (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992), arts. 
175, 177(b), 184, 172, 178, 215(2), 93(2) [hereinafter EC TREATY]. 
126 Access to national courts is direct, while access to Community courts may be either directly 
or indirectly obtained. 
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types of EU legislation. 127 Regulations create rights and obligations 
which are directly and uniformly applicable within the EU both to the 
Member States and to the individual nationals. There is disagreement, 
however, regarding the extent to which regulations create individual 
and enforceable rights in the national courts. 128 Unlike regulations, 
directives are not directly integrated within the Member States' national 
law, but call upon the Member States to adapt national law to the 
common standards laid down by the EU institutions. 129 They are, there-
fore, focused mainly on the legal relationship between the EU and the 
Member State. 13° Consequently, directives generally do not create di-
rectly enforceable rights and obligations for individuals, although 
there are some important exceptions.131 Decisions, the third type of 
legislation, are measures that produce specific and binding legal effects 
upon those to whom the decision is addressed; they may also be 
non-binding informal acts of a general nature requiring the implemen-
tation of legislation. 132 Decisions are always directly applicable to those 
individuals to whom they are addressed and are true administrative 
acts. 133 Such decisions under strict conditions (Article 173 ( 4)), have 
traditionally provided the only opportunity for private party direct 
access to litigation in EU courts.134 As will be seen later, locus standi of 
private parties before the ECJ is determined by these distinctions and 
their interpretation in the evolving EU case law. 135 
VII. DISPUTE REsoLuTION AND DIRECT PRIVATE PARTY AccEss IN 
NAFTA 
The NAFTA negotiators opted for a dispute resolution mechanism 
based on a minimal number of inter-governmental and supranational 
institutions and a narrow scope of supranational jurisdiction for several 
reasons. First, the NAFTA drafters wished to make sure that the politi-
127ToTH, supra note 58, at 55-61. 
128 See id. at 57-60. 
129 See id. at 61-64. 
130 See id. 
m See id. 
132 See ToTH, supra note 58, at 65-68. 
133 See id. 
134 This has changed since the Codorniu decision, which suggests that even a "true regulation" 
may be subject to attack by a private party if it is of individual and direct concern to that party. 
Case C-309/89, Codorniu SA v. Council, 1994 E.C.R. I-1879, [1995] 2 C.M.L.R. 561, 586--87 
(1994). 
135 See infra part VIII. 
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cal and economic inequality among the Parties136 would be neutralized 
in the post-agreement situation to make way for a new trilateral trade 
relationship among the United States, Canada, and Mexico. 137 Also, 
notwithstanding the concern regarding the impact of imbalanced po-
litical and economic power, doubt prevailed among the drafters con-
cerning the impartiality of the national courts in international dispute 
hearings. 138 This sentiment explains their reluctance to employ litiga-
tion, and their preference for ADR, the mechanisms of which seemed 
better suited to address both the balance of power among the Parties 
while at the same time ensuring utmost regard for their national 
sovereignty. 139 Based on previous experience, the NAFTA drafters be-
lieved that such a strategy held great promise because of success en-
joyed under the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA) .140 
It is therefore reasonable to argue that the NAFTA dispute resolution 
mechanism reflects an adoption of the theory of ADR, as well as an 
extension of such procedures. This theory was founded on long-stand-
ing international trade experience evolving incrementally in the 
GATT, and subsequently improved and adopted by the FTA. The man-
ner in which ADR was crafted into NAFTA, however, left little room 
for non-state parties to access dispute resolution directly on the tran-
snational level. 
NAFTA provides for three main dispute resolution mechanisms 
which may be arranged in a hierarchy according to the degree of access 
to transnational justice accorded to the individual.141 Robert F. Hous-
man highlights direct access by the individual to the national courts of 
the Parties as the top ranking access in the NAFTA scheme.142 "[T]he 
strongest mechanism to achieve transnationaljustice"143 is provided in 
Article 1701 (1) of Chapter Seventeen, the intellectual property rights 
(IPR) chapter, which ensures adequate judicial and administrative laws 
under each of the Parties' domestic laws, and allows for access to 
136 Factors of political and economic inequaltiy include size of market and "developed" versus 
"developing country." See Johnson, supra note 78, at 2177-78. 
137 ld. As pointed out earlier (supra section VI), however, this egalitarian approach does not 
apply to private parties, and at least leaves out those affected socially and laborwise. See also Miller, 
supra note 15, at 1316-17. 
138 See Johnson, supra note 78, at 2178. 
139 See id. 
140 See Free-Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can., 27 l.L.M. 281, (entered into force Jan. 
1, 1989) [hereinafter FTA]. 
141 See Housman, supra note 71, at 532. 
142 See id. 
143 Id. 
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non-NAFfA IPR holders as well. Specifically, Article 1701 reads as 
follows: 
Article 1701: Nature and Scope of Obligations. 
1. Each Party shall provide in its territory to the nationals 
of another Party adequate and effective protection and en-
forcement of intellectual property rights, while ensuring that 
measures to enforce intellectual property rights do not them-
selves become barriers to legitimate trade. 144 
When adding the consideration of equality under the law to this 
"hierarchy formula," however, access to different laws in different na-
tional courts does not provide for the highest quality of access (which 
consists of access to the same law). 
The second level in the access hierarchy is private party direct access 
to transnational binding arbitration which, due to the provision of final 
decision, also satisfies the equality requirement.145 Below this level is 
non-binding arbitration, the level of consultation, mediation, and the 
issuance of non-binding reports.146 Viewed from this perspective, the 
NAFfA has only one private party direct access mechanism which is 
provided for under Chapter Eleven on investment, representing 
NAFfA's major contribution to the "equalization" of state and non-
state actors. In addition to the importance of private party direct access, 
the provision mandating that disputes between the private investor and 
the state be governed by the relevant rules of international law ensures 
party-to-party equality under the law. 147 As mentioned earlier, NAFfA's 
approach is sectoral, and the access question is therefore dealt with on 
a sectoral basis. Since investment activity can be carried out in a variety 
of economic sectors, however, its provisions are horizontally applied 
across the NAFfA board. Consequently, direct access to ADR through 
the investment chapter indirectly allows for direct access in other areas 
as well, such as transportation, telecommunications, and automobiles. 
A. Chapter Eleven 
Chapter Eleven is the Investment Chapter and Section B is its dis-
pute resolution component. 148 When signed, "it [was] the only provi-
144 NAFI'A, supra note 4, art. 1701. 
145 For the various ADR mechanisms, see johnson, supra note 78, passim. 
146 See id. 
147 See NAFI'A, supra note 4, art. 1130; Joint Working Group, supra note 102, at 835. 
146 See NAFI'A, supra note 4, arts. 1115-38. 
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sion in any of the world's major trade agreements which permit[ ted] 
private investors to take governments to binding arbitration over vio-
lations of their treaty obligations. "149 It has no counterpart in the FTA, 
and generally redefines the Calvo Doctrine.150 
The dispute resolution mechanism in Chapter Eleven provides for 
consultation and binding arbitration for the settlement of investor-state 
disputes embedded in existing international law conventions. 151 Sec-
tion A, which precedes the dispute resolution Section B, provides a list 
of obligations which, in the event of failure of compliance, are consid-
ered causes of action allowing a private party to file a claim for binding 
arbitration. The possible causes of action are as follows: 
-Failure by the host government to accord an investor na-
tional treatment with respect to the establishment, acquisi-
tion, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale 
or other disposition of investments; 
-Failure by the host government to accord a foreign investor 
most-favored-nation treatment with respect to such activities; 
-Failure by the host government to accord a foreign investor 
the better of national treatment or most-favored-nation treat-
ment; 
-Failure by the host government to accord a foreign investor 
a minimum standard of treatment under international law; 
-Imposition by the host government of specific perform-
ance requirements such as minimum export levels, domestic 
content rules, preferences for domestic sourcing, trade bal-
ancing, exclusive supply, and technology transfer require-
ments; 
-Imposition by the host government of a requirement that 
the senior management be of a particular nationality; 
149 Bodie, supra note 54, at 162. It also is the first time that Canada and Mexico have bound 
themselves in an international agreement allowing for arbitration between themselves and a 
foreign national. See id.; see also Harry B. Endsley, Dispute Settlement Under the CFTA and NAFTA: 
From Eleventh-Hour Innovation to Accepted Institution, 18 HAsT. lNT'L & CaMP. L. REv. 659, 663 
(1995). 
150 See Endsley, supra note 148, at 688; Manning-Cabrol, supra note 1. Study of this effect is 
beyond the scope of this article. 
151 My analysis of Chapter Eleven is based largely on Gary N. Horlick & F. Amanda DeBusk, 
Dispute Resolution under NAFTA, 10 J. lNT'L ARB. 51 (1993); Endsley, supra note 148; PATERSON, 
supra note 22; Bodie, supra note 54; Daniel M. Price, An Overview of the NAFTA Investment 
Chapter: Substantive Rules in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 27 lNT'L LAw. 727 (1993). Other 
commentaries consulted will be mentioned where applicable. 
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-Failure by the host government to permit free transfers of 
profits, payments and other investment returns in a freely 
usable currency, or to permit the conversion of local currency 
into foreign currency at prevailing market rates; 
-Noncomplying expropriation of the investment by the host 
government.152 
As liberal as this list is, various factors, such as reservations declared 
under the Canadian and Mexican investment laws whereby Canada 
and Mexico have excluded certain types of legislation from obligations 
under Chapter Eleven, have circumscribed its scope.153 
A supplement to the list of obligations is the list of conditions by 
which the investor must abide in order to advance a claim. Articles 
1116 and 1117 provide that the investor, or a firm owned by the 
investor in the host country, must allege direct loss or damage incurred 
due to breach of a Section A obligation.154 The claim must be timely 
submitted, according to Articles 1116(2) and 1117(2), within three 
years of the date on which the investor knew, or should have known, 
of the alleged breach of NAFTA and the resulting damage. 155 Article 
1118 obliges the investor to attempt consultation and negotiation as a 
first step in dispute resolution, and thus avoids recourse to arbitra-
tion.156 Article 1119 requires the investor to serve notice of intent to 
submit a claim to arbitration. at least 90 days before submitting it. 157 
Article 1120 provides further that the claim may be submitted only 
after six months have elapsed from the date of breach.158 There is no 
mandatory arbitration, and Article 1121 establishes that the aggrieved 
investor must consent to arbitration and waive the right to initiate or 
continue the dispute through other avenues.159 Article 1122 requires 
152 In the quoted text, Endsley summarizes NAITA Articles 1102(1), ll03(1), 1104, 1105, 
ll06(1)1107(1), ll09(1)-(2), 1110(1) respectively. Endsley, supra note 149, at 687. 
153 The argument that financial services are precluded is inaccurate as Chapter 14 on Financial 
Services does incorporate the Chapter 11 dispute resolution mechanism. See Endsley, supra note 
149, at 688. With regard to Parties' decisions, for instance, the host government may invoke 
national security as an exception to Chapter Eleven Section B, or require the screening of 
investors as provided under Canadian and Mexican laws. See NAITA, supra note 4, art. 1138. 
154 See NAITA, supra note 4, arts. 1116, 1117. Certain provisions regarding government mo-
nopolies are also referenced in Chapter Fifteen on Competition Policy, Monopolies and State 
Enterprises. See id. at ch. 15. 
155 See NAITA, supra note 4, arts. 1116(2), 1ll7(2). 
156 See id. at art. 1118. 
157 See id. at art. 1119. 
158 See id. at art. ll20. 
159 See id. at art. ll21. 
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the governments of the Parties to provide advance consent to arbitra-
tion in order to prevent a host country from undermining the proce-
dure.160 Canada has provided such consent by way of legislation. 161 
The disputing investor may submit the claim for arbitration in one 
of the following three ways: (1) in accordance with ICSID rules pro-
vided that the investor's country and the host country are both parties 
to the Convention;162 (2) under the ICSID Additional Facility, which 
requires only one country to be a party to the Convention;163 or (3) 
before the ad hoc arbitral tribunal in accordance with the UNCITRAL 
rules. 164 Article 1123 provides for the establishment of a three-member 
arbitral tribunal.l65 Each party to the dispute appoints one member to 
the tribunal and both agree on the presiding arbitrator.166 Article 1124 
provides for an appointment procedure in the event the parties fail to 
reach an agreement. 167 Article 1126 allows for the consolidation of 
multiple claims, and Articles 1127-1129 govern the communication of 
information to the non-involved Party and the enforceability of an 
award. 168 
Important to private party direct access are the Article 1131 and 1132 
provisions regarding the substantive law to be applied. 169 The Articles 
specifY that the guiding law for the arbitral tribunal must be in accord 
with NAFTA, the Commission's interpretation of the agreement under 
Article 2001, and the applicable international law. 170 While this en-
hances reliance on and the credibility of the process, the absence of a 
deadline for the resolution of an investment dispute by the arbitral 
160 See NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1122. 
161 NAFIA Implementation Act, supra note 24. 
l62 See ICSID, supra note 107: Neither Canada nor Mexico are parties to the ICSID, which 
excludes application of its arbitration rules under NAFIA for the time being. 
163 See ICSID Additional Facility, supra note I 08. This procedure is available for use only in the 
event of the United States being the host government, or if a United States national is involved 
in an investment dispute with either nationals of Canada or Mexico, or the latter countries being 
the host governments. It is not available for investment disputes involving a Canada-Mexico 
relationship. 
164 See New York Convention, supra note 109. 
165 See NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1123. 
166 The question of the fees and expenses is also important as a factor in encouraging private 
party use of the process. Horlick & DeBusk, supra note 151, at 54. 
167NAFfA, supra note 4, art. 1124. 
168 !d. at arts. 1126-1129. 
169 !d. at arts. 1131-1132. 
170 !d. 
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tribunal may operate as a deterrent to private parties and discourage 
them from having recourse to this remedy. 171 
Additionally, vesting private party direct access with tangible power 
depends on its enforceability and awards. Article 1136 provides that 
the panel's decision is binding.172 Article 1136 states that the Parties 
undertake to enforce the award domestically.173 In the event of failure, 
the ICSID and the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention) or 
the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitra-
tion174 may be invoked under Article 1136.175 As a result, the investor 
will not be denied the right to seek the enforcement of the award. 
Article 1136 specifies that the awards have no precedential effect, a 
provision which has been questioned as a matter of de facto norm 
creation.176 While this Article also allows for the opportunity to seek ei-
ther revision or annulment of the award before enforcement is sought, 
Chapter Eleven itself is silent on challenges to panel decisions. 177 The 
possibility of "appeal" remains subject to the rules of the relevant 
arbitral regime and thus possibility of appeal varies from case to case. 178 
Chapter Eleven is a first model for private party direct access and 
will therefore probably be improved upon in future agreements. It 
must be noted, however, that Chapter Eleven offers direct access only 
to arbitration, not to formal adjudication. From the Canadian and 
American points of view, this does not represent a shortcoming, since 
in both countries foreign arbitral awards are easier to implement than 
foreign court judgments. 
171 Horlick and DeBuck mention the length of the ICSID procedure as one among other factors 
for the infrequent use of the Convention. Horlick & DeBuck, supra note 151, at 56. While there 
are deadlines dealing with the Party's duties, or regarding the interpretative function of the 
Commission, NAFfA does not prescribe deadlines with regard to the tribunal decision. Similarly, 
the three international arbitral agreements do not provide any relevant limitations. 
172NAFfA, supra note 4, art. 1136. 
173Jd. 
174 Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30, 1975, U.S.-
Mex., 14 I.L.M. 336 [hereinafter Panama Convention]. 
175 Horlick & DeBuck, supra note 151, at 56; NAFfA, supra note 4, art. 1136. 
176 Price argues that tribunals will probably consider decisions of other tribunals. Price, supra 
note 151, at 735; NAFfA, supra note 4, art. 1136. 
177 See Horlick & DeBuck, supra note 151, at 56. 
178 /d. 
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B. Chapter Nineteen 
Besides Chapter Eleven, NAFTA provides for two other important 
ADR mechanisms. Chapter Nineteen (modeled after the FTA Chapter 
Nineteen), the anti-dumping and countervailing duty (AD/CVD) 
chapter, establishes the procedure for the review of relevant adminis-
trative determinations that are made under national law. It provides a 
mechanism based on panels that "would serve simply as surrogates for 
reviewing courts and decide cases in accordance with the same legal 
standards that courts would apply."179 Despite the fact that this ADR 
process allows only for indirect private party access, it operates similarly 
to a fully direct process. Article 1904 ( 5) stipulates that only an involved 
party may request a panel review, but that a Party must request a review 
when requested to do so by a private party. 180 Thus, unlike Chapter 
Twenty, it provides for private party initiation of the process. 
According to Rule 33(1) of the NAFTA Rules of Procedure for 
Article 1904 Binational Panel Reviews181 ("1904 Rules"), any person 
interested in AD/CVD proceedings may serve a Notice of Intent to 
Commence Judicial Review on the involved Secretariat and all other 
persons involved in the final determination proceedings. 182 An "inter-
ested person" according to the 1904 Rules is any person who, by the 
laws of the country where the final determination is made, would be 
entitled to appear and be present in a judicial review. 183 Canada and 
the United States have already provided for such laws before NAFTA, 
and Mexico committed itself to amend its laws accordingly.184 The 
interested party has no discretion but to make the actual request for 
the panel review once the Notice of Intent to Commence Judicial 
Review is served. 185 The request being made, any interested person 
alleging an error either of fact or law regarding the investigating 
authority may file a Complaint. 186 Also, the investigating authority and 
179Homer Moyer makes a point in adding "that notwithstanding numerous parallels with the 
domestic courts they supplant, five-member panels are obviously different from courts and create 
different dynamics in the review process." Homer E. Moyer, Jr., Chapter 19 of the NAFTA: 
Binational Panels as the Trade Courts of Last Resort, 27 INT'L LAw. 707, 707 (1993). 
180 SeeNAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1904(5). 
181 North American Free Trade Agreement Rules of Procedure for Article 1904 Binational Panel 
Review, reprinted in 1 NAFTA TREATY MATERIALS (1994) [hereinafter 1904 Rules]. For a detailed 
discussion of private party access in Chapter 19, see Bodie supra note 54, at 94-97. 
1821904 Rules, supra note 181. 
IB31d. 
184Horlick & DeBuck, supra note 151, at 59. 
185Bodie, supra note 54, at 94-97. 
1B61d. 
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any other interested person not filing a Complaint may file a Notice 
of Appearance. 187 Persons filing either a Complaint or a Notice of 
Appearance have the right to make representations to the panel and 
to participate fully in the proceedings. 188 
Chapter Nineteen's ADR mechanism also provides for the so-called 
"extraordinary challenge" exception to the non-reviewable and bind-
ing nature of the panel decisions. 189 This procedure resembles judicial 
review in that it addresses issues of procedural unfairness in the con-
duct of proceedings. 190 While any interested person in fact has access 
to the bi-national panel review mechanism, the initiation of the "ex-
traordinary challenge" remains completely at the discretion of the 
Parties.191 Nevertheless, the interested person has the right to partici-
pate fully in the proceedings. 192 
Since NAFfA provides for minimal guidelines regarding harmoni-
zation and standardization of AD/CVD laws among the Parties gov-
erned by the World Trade Organization (WTO) ,193 it establishes the 
lowest common denominator, namely that the standard of review ap-
plied by the panel is that of the importing country.194 Speed of review 
is also an important concern in the Chapter's procedure195 and may be 
seen as a means to enhance access.196 
187 /d. 
188 Jd. 
189 Moyer, supra note 179, at 709. 
190 See id. 
191 NAFTA, supra note 4, art. 1904(13). 
192 See id. The Extraordinary Challenge Committee (ECC) is "available only under unusual 
circumstances comprising of gross misconduct, bias, breach of fundamental procedures, or action 
that manifestly exceeds the authority panels have been given." Moyer, supra note 179, at 709; see 
also PATERSON, supra note 22, at 3.9(b); Bodie, supra note 54, at 94-97. While impressed by the 
initiation provision (of indirect access), Bodie deplores the lack of private party access to tile ECC 
procedure where even access through the government is precluded. See Bodie, supra note 54. 
The Joint Working Group is satisfied with the de facto private party access established in this 
chapter. See joint Working Group, supra note 102, at 835. 
193 According to Article 1902(2) on the Retention of Domestic Antidumping Law and the 
Countervailing Duty Law, a Party may change its AD/CVD law as it applies to other Parties. The 
parties must be notified in advance of the change's enactment, however, only if such change is 
explicitly applicable to the other Parties and is consistent with GATT law and the object and 
purpose of NAFTA. In Article 1903, NAFTA provides for the establishment of a bi-national panel 
to issue a declaratory opinion regarding the consistency of tile change with Article 1902(2) and 
with any earlier panel decision if applicable. See NAFTA, supra note 4, arts. 1902 (2), 1903. 
194 See Moyer, supra note 179, at 708. 
195 See id. at 716. 
196 See Moyer, supra note 179, at 716-18. 
1998] PRIVATE PARTY DIRECT ACCESS 33 
C. Chapter Twenty 
Chapter Twenty, entitled "Institutional Arrangements and Dispute 
Settlement Procedures," is the institutional chapter of NAFTA.197 The 
institutions and procedures developed therein focus on cooperation 
between the Parties and are designed to assist them in avoiding 
conflict. For this purpose, Chapter Twenty establishes a sequential 
process of dispute resolution starting with consultation, but which may 
end in arbitration. This mechanism applies only to state-to-state dis-
putes and precludes private party direct access or initiation. Article 
2021 on Private Rights states that "[n]o Party may provide for a right 
of action under its domestic law against any other Party on the ground 
that a measure of another Party is inconsistent with this Agreement."198 
Thus, it leaves the lobbying of the respective government as the only 
redress available to the individual. As discussed in Section VI of this 
article, this is, at best, indirect/representative access to justice, and 
discriminates against private parties where success in eliciting their 
government's attention and support depends on differences in domes-
tic legislation and avenues for access. 199 
D. The Side-Agreements 
The two side agreements to NAFTA, on labor (NAALC) 200 and on 
environmental cooperation (NAAEC), 201 provide for limited private 
party access in their respective areas. 202 As NAFTA only marginally 
addresses labor issues, Article 4 of the Labor accord contends with a 
requirement ofthe Parties to grant individuals access to administrative, 
quasi-administrative, judicial, or labor tribunals to enforce the domes-
tic labor laws. 203 Article 5 provides an equity and transparency require-
ment, as well as some due process rights.204 The NAAEC establishes a 
submission procedure205 available for private parties which must be 
ranked at the lowest end of the ADR scale for two reasons. First, it 
197 See NAFTA, supra note 4, ch. 20. This chapter is tailored after, and expands upon, the ITA 
Chapter 18. See Endsley, supra note 149, at 676. 
198NAFfA, supra note 4, art. 2021. 
199Bodie, supra note 54, at 141. 
20o See NAALC, supra note 29. 
201 See NAAEC, supra note 30. 
2°2 See NAALC, supra note 29, art. 6; NAAEC, supra note 30, art. 4. 
203PATERSON, supra note 22, at 3.11 (b) (iii). 
204Jd. 
2°5NAAEC, supra note 30, arts. 14, 15, (and for an even weaker mode of access, art. 13). 
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results in a report on environmental law violations which may be made 
public at the discretion of the NAAEC Council.2°6 Second, this report 
has, at best, the power of sensitizing public opinion and embarrassing 
the Party violator. While generally presented as part of NAFfA, these 
agreements are true "side-agreements," marginal both in importance 
and impact in comparison to the main trade agreement. 
VIII. DisPUTE REsoLUTION AND PRIVATE PARTY DIRECT AccEss IN 
THEEU 
Unlike the NAFfA, the EU prefers the traditional formal adjudica-
tory resolution of disputes over ADR methods. The question of access 
is therefore largely a question of access to the judicial institutions of 
the Community. Since the establishment of the CFI, access no longer 
centers on the ECJ. While the CFI maintains jurisdiction over any 
category of direct action by private parties, the ECJ covers preliminary 
rulings and serves as a court of appeal on points of law.207 The right of 
appeal is a right not subject to any screening, and there is no need to 
obtain leave to appeal.2°8 
The judicial procedures provided by the EC Treaty are concentrated 
in Articles 169, 177, and 173.209 Article 169 gives the Commission the 
sole right to file proceedings regarding the non-, or deficient, imple-
mentation of Community law by Member States.210 Under Article 170, 
Member States also have the right to file such proceedings.211 These 
articles exclude the private party for both purposes of direct litigation 
and intervention.212 Under Article 177, the private party may be repre-
sented by the Member State which files a preliminary reference with 
the ECJ. 213 The national court makes the reference.214 Both the parties 
to the action before that court and the Member State in which it is 
206PATERSON, supra note 22, at 3.ll(a)(iii). 
207 See Brown, supra note 50, at 743-44. 
20B See id. Grounds for appeal are comprised of lack of competence of the CFI, a breach of 
procedure before the CFI which adversely affects the interests of the appellant, and infringement 
of Community law by the CFI. If the appeal is upheld, the ECJ may quash the CFI decision and 
give either a final judgment (where permitted by the law), or refer it back to the CFI for judgment. 
The judicial history so far shows that most appeals have failed. See id. at 744, 746, 753. 
209 See Am ten brink, supra note 34, at 36, 37. 
2!0 See id. at 36. 
2ll See id. 
212 See id. 
213 See id. at 36. 
2!4 See Amtenbrink, supra note 34, at 37. 
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situated have the right to submit written and oral observations to the 
ECJ independently. 215 This procedural device may be used to review 
the validity of Community legislation, as well as to protect private party 
rights arising from the Community's legal order against any obstruct-
ing nationallegislation.216 As this procedure requires representation by 
the state, the question of standing is subject to disparities among the 
various national legal orders. 217 
EC Article 173( 4) 218 provides the only allowance for private party 
direct access to the CFI and allows an annulment action under the 
following conditions: 
[A]ny natural or legal person may ... institute proceedings 
against a decision addressed to that person or against a deci-
sion, which, although in the form of a regulation or a decision 
addressed to another person, is of direct and individual con-
cern to the former.219 
Locus standi is thus narrowly defined, limiting access to the following 
situations: ( 1) where the private party is challenging the decision that 
is addressed to it, (2) where the "decision" is in the form of a "regula-
tion," or (3) where the decision which is addressed to another person 
is of "direct and individual concern." As mentioned earlier, in light of 
the ECJ's decision in the Codorniu220 case, this is no longer conclusive. 
A central bone of contention, this has drawn much criticism against 
the EU law. The main areas of criticism concern the (1) definition of 
"individual concern," (2) the determination of "class of persons gen-
erally affected" versus "individualization," (3) the definition of "direct 
concern," and ( 4) the distinction between decisions addressed to the 
Member States and those addressed to private parties. 221 As the EU law 
evolves, the Courts, and not the Council, have gradually expanded the 
application of Article 173(4) with respect to the groups of applicants 
and the nature of the legal acts that can be annulled. 222 
215 ld. 
216 See id. 
217 See id. 
2IB Formerly 173(2). 
219 See Amtenbrink, supra note 34, at 37. The time limit is two months after enactment of the 
decision. BEBR, supra note 65, at 34 n.70. 
22°Case C-309/89, Codorniu v. Council, 1994 E.C.R. 1-1879, [1995] 2 C.M.L.R. 561 (1994). 
221 ld. 
222 See Am ten brink, supra note 34, at 36. 
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To be sure, due to the so-called "democratic deficit" and the limited 
legislative competence of the European Parliament, the European 
courts have, by default, become entrusted with such power. 223 In adjust-
ing to this reality, a strong argument has been made in favor of ex-
panding, if not totally removing, the locus standi requirement, so as to 
enable effective public interest representation at least in the Courts 
where part of the law appears to be made.224 
The range of issues raised by the legislative juxtaposition of the 
nature of the private person (whether a natural individual, a "legal 
person" such as companies and corporations, or interest and pressure 
groups in a "class action"); the nature of the legal act (regulation or 
decision, the correlated question of the effective remedy in case of 
breach of the law); and the nature of the interest at point (direct and 
individual), resulted in a complex matrix of legal questions to which 
the Courts were forced to address their attention.225 As one author 
stated, "individuals are not exactly queuing at the door of the registry 
to file actions in the Court of Justice";226 only one significant case so 
far has been lodged individually by a natural person. 227 The difficulty 
of access has been bypassed in a variety ofways. For instance, individu-
als have joined together to enhance their access. 228 The recent Co-
223 See Harlow, supra note 56, at 217. 
224 See generally Harlow, supra note 56, at 217-18. Among the many ways to remedy the situation, 
Harlow proposes to base access rights on procedural rights, which is a common administrative 
law technique, and to use the concept of "legitimate interest" as the basis for standing. ld. at 239. 
The most restrictive is to accord standing, or locus standi, only where some legal rights 
of the applicant have been infringed by the contested measure. A more liberal approach 
is to accord standing where, although the applicant cannot point to an infringement of 
his legal rights, he can show that he has been adversely affected in some other way. The 
most liberal approach is to allow an actio popularis, or citizen's action, to be brought on 
the basis that every citizen has an interest in ensuring that public bodies act within their 
powers. This approach, it has been observed, is tantamount to "the dissolution of locus 
standi." 
Arnull, supra note 64, at 7. For an excellent review and analysis of the range of reasons for the 
blocking of private party access by the Courts' application of Article 173 ( 4), see Hjalte Rasmussen, 
Why is Article 173 Interpreted Against Private PlaintiffS?, 5 EuR. L. REv. 112 (1980). 
225 Evidently, an exhaustive study of the impact of standing in the European Courts requires a 
more thorough examination than is possible within the confines of this article. This must include 
a detailed review of the relevant European case law. 
226 Harlow, supra note 56, at 232. 
227 Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 461; Joined Cases 145/83 & 
53/84, Stanley George Adams v. Commission, 1985 E.C.R. 3539. Adams was an action for damages 
under the second paragraph of Article 215, not an action for annulment under Article 173. See 
also Harding, supra note 73. 
228 Twenty-three individual fishermen joined together with forty-six more represented by an 
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dorniu case229 has broadened the class of potential applicants, suggest-
ing that representative bodies will have standing to bring annulment 
proceedings on behalf of their members in a growing number of 
contexts.230 
Non-individuals such as companies and corporate bodies have used 
Article 173( 4) to protect and promote their interests, employing a 
range of litigation strategies including the "repeat player" and the 
"saga" or the "big issue. "231 As observed earlier regarding access to 
NAFfA, this ability sets non-individuals apart from the individual pri-
vate party and creates a de facto situation of inequality in the EU. In 
the EU, this is true with respect to access to litigation. This deficiency 
can be overcome only partly by a less stringent standing law.232 
The Codorniu case has raised hopes for liberalization in another 
aspect of the standing rule, namely with regard to the nature of the act 
involved in the Article 173( 4) proceedings.233 It has, for the first time, 
suggested the possibility of a private party to challenge a true regula-
tion. 234 The Codorniu decision, moreover, has lifted the inflexible re-
quirement of bringing proceedings only against decisions, or having 
to show that a regulation was, in fact, a decision "in guise" of a regu-
lation.235 
In Codorniu, the Court indicated that "an applicant may be individu-
ally concerned by a regulation if that regulation has special and serious 
economic consequences for him. "236 The Court made clear, however, 
that these economic consequences must be of such a nature as to 
association in the Spanish Fisheries case. Case 55/86, Asociacion provincial de Armadores de 
buques de pesca de Gran Sol de Ponteverda (Arposal) v. Council, 1988 E.C.R. 13, [1989] 2 
C.M.L.R. 508 (1988). 
229Case C-309/89, Codorniu v. Council, 1994 E.C.R. I-1879, [1995] 2 C.M.L.R. 561 (1994). This 
is one of the last judgments of the ECJ before the transfer of all private party direct actions to 
the CFI. 
230 Representative bodies are permitted standing in annulment proceedings in the context of 
dumping. 
231 See Harlow, supra note 56, at 236--37. 
232 Even the removal of locus standi will not suffice to overcome the impact of disparities in the 
availability of economic resources which play an equally important role in enhancing access in 
both transnational and domestic law. This has resulted in a demand for new and more legal aid 
provisions based on an EU legal right of access to the courts. See Mel Cousins, Access to the Courts: 
The European Convention on Human Rights and European Community Law, 14 DuBLIN U. LJ. 51, 
62~4 (1992). 
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differentiate the applicant from all other persons affected by the con-
tested provision. 237 
First, the contested provision "must place the applicant at a disad-
vantage on the market or, in other words, affect its competitive position 
on the market."238 Second, the contested provision "must concern an 
important part of the applicant's economic activities, and must repre-
sent a serious risk for the profitability of the applicant's business. "239 
Consequently, the nature of the concern, and the requirement that it 
be an individual concern, appear to be the most serious obstacles to 
significant relaxation of the locus standi law.240 The law currently in 
place is found in the ECJ definition of "individual concern" in the 
Plaumann judgment,241 where the Court established that: 
somebody cannot claim to be individually concerned by a 
measure when he belongs to a general group of traders simi-
larly affected by and defined in abstract terms in the measure 
which is being challenged. He must be distinguished in some 
form or other just as an addressee.242 
In 1996, the Intergovernmental Conference on the Amendment of 
the Treaty on European Union began to review the list of Community 
acts.243 It was expected to introduce some hierarchy of norms in the 
hope of fostering certainty and harmonization, and of improving per-
formance. The question of locus standi of private parties, one of the 
more complicated laws of the EU, will undoubtedly represent a crucial 
issue on the Conference's agenda. 
237 fd. 
238 See Case-309/89, Codorniu v. Council, 1994 E.C.R. 1-1879, [1995) 2 C.M.L.R. 561 (1994). 
239 ld. 
240 Unlike other commentators, Neuwahl raises the argument that an overbroad relaxation of 
the standing rule may create serious problems that may lead to considerable uncertainty, particu-
larly in the economic context. See Neuwahl, supra note 11, at 18. 
241 Case 25/62, Plaumann v. Commission, 1963 E.C.R. 95, [1964) C.M.L.R. 29. 
242Neuwahl, supra note 11, at 20. This, along with the other definitional problems of Article 
173(4), raised the issue of whether anti-dumping regulations are regulations or decisions, and 
whether they are specifically addressing imports and importers. To avoid uncertainty, the Court 
decided to drop the question of the nature of the act and to concentrate on individual concern 
for the purpose of anti-dumping measures. This subject is however beyond the scope of this 
article. 
243 ld. at 17. 
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IX. IN LIEU OF CONCLUSION: DOES THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 
NAFTA AND THE EU REGARDING PRIVATE PARTY DIRECT AccEss 
REALLY MATTER? 
39 
While NAFTA is a free-trade agreement, the EU is an economic 
union. NAFTA is defensive about national sovereignty, whereas the EU 
deliberately thrives on the transfer of sovereign powers. At first glance, 
it would therefore appear that to compare the two arrangements a-
mounts to comparing apples and oranges. Both NAFTA and the EU, 
however, are regional trade agreements and, as such, impact the lives 
of the people living within the Member States. This, in itself, justifies 
a comparison. 
The NAFTA-model FTA, while more limited in purpose than the 
customs union (CU), is therefore likely to be more diversionary.244 
Consequently, the FTA may be more limited than a CU because it is a 
less economically important phenomenon.245 A ITA, such as NAFTA, 
however, is at least as economically significant as the EU customs 
union.246 
Designed to establish trade regimes, both the EU and NAFTA share 
the purpose of promoting market reliance and activity. Private party 
access to dispute resolution, and the quality of such access, are impor-
tant factors in the success of such an endeavor. While NAFTA does not 
address the question directly, the entire approach to dispute resolution 
adopted in the agreement sends a strong message that individuals 
should not rely on the representation of their interests by their gov-
ernments.247 Rather, it suggests that individuals secure their position in 
well designed contracts when engaging in trade not involving govern-
mental action. 248 This, however, leaves the non-contractual third party 
vulnerable to the impact of the inter-governmental and multilateral 
regime. In this respect especially, the broader, principled approach of 
the EU offers a greater advantage to the private party, both to the 
national of the EU and to the non-national party trading with the EU. 
Private party direct access to justice is purely an economic/trade 
issue for NAFTA. In contrast, private party direct access for the EU 
244 Abbott II, supra note ll5, at 919. 
245 Id. 
246 See id. 
247 See Miller, supra note 15, at 1367, 1319. 
248 See id. Miller draws attention to the increasing degree of protection evolving in the field of 
state contracts with foreign investors, and to the fact that NAFTA is almost mute in relation to 
private commercial disputes. See id. 
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encompasses economic and human rights issues. While the NAFTA 
stands for a decentralized regime, the EU represents the model of a 
centralized and harmonized economic area. The comparison between 
the approaches and provisions in the two regional arrangements may 
help answer the question concerning "the extent to which decentrali-
zation and the absence of approximation measures" can successfully 
proceed.249 Such success depends on effective dispute resolution. Ab-
bott, however, dismisses the possibility of weak regional dispute settle-
ment institutions, which are unable to enforce their decisions on the 
member Parties and to carry out their mandate effectively.250 
However, ADR is not by definition weaker than court action, nor is 
there anything inherently superior in formal adjudication over arbitra-
tion. On the contrary, arbitration is arguably the preferable course to 
ensure states' compliance with international agreements. Arbitration 
is based on the prerequisite that the parties to the dispute mutually 
consent to settle their disagreement. Therefore, unlike the formal 
adjudication procedure, which is independent of the parties' will and 
is imposed on them, the arbitral award is more likely to be effectively 
enforced. This has also been the practice in international agreements. 
A strong argument can be made in recommending the expansion 
of NAFTA's Chapter Eleven dispute resolution mechanism to other 
areas. Since the Parties agreed on private party direct access in the field 
of investment-an area traditionally of utmost importance in domestic 
law-it seems most likely that they are capable to agree on private party 
direct access for the settlement of disputes in other trade sectors which 
attract investors. 
The direct initiation of the arbitration process is the ultimate goal. 
Under both trade regimes, however, indirect initiation also plays an 
important role. Under NAFTA's Chapter Nineteen, the government 
must represent the requesting private party. In the EU, the national 
government must initiate a Community legal process upon the initia-
tion of a private party legal action on the domestic level. Nevertheless, 
249 Abbott I, supra note 16, at 123. 
250 ''Weak regional dispute settlement institutions, i.e. without power to force compliance by 
member countries, fail by design to facilitate the necessary moves towards the harmonization of 
legal regimes .... A structure such as that provided for in ... NAFTA, which permits parties to 
accept the withdrawal of concessions rather than conform their laws to decisions of dispute 
settlement panels, appears really to countenance the slow disintegration of the union because it 
encourages the parties to gradually withdraw the trade concessions they initially grant." Abbott 
II, supra note 115, at 944-45. The limited access provision to private parties can be read into this 
weakness because Abbott bases his observation on a comparison with the EU. 
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while the private party in the EU enjoys dual access-to the national 
as well as to the neutral Community institutions-NAFTA does not 
provide access to an institution, but only to a process. 
The institutional aspect of access is significant with regard to cer-
tainty in the application of the law in two ways. First, an uncertain panel 
under NAFTA's Chapter Eleven may request the Free Trade Commis-
sion's interpretation, but is powerless in the event of the Commission's 
inaction. In comparison, due to its institutional structures, the EU 
provides not only for an international legal "umbrella" allowing for a 
unified interpretation of the treaty, but also for a mechanism to gen-
erate such interpretation. Second, domestic courts diverge as to the 
rules of their jurisdiction. Some degree of harmonization achieved 
through the Free Trade Commission's interpretation is, however, in-
sufficient to alleviate the inequalities resulting from the differences in 
the courts' rules of jurisdiction. Consequently, empowering the Free 
Trade Commission respectively, or the establishment of a NAFTA 
Trade Arbitration Tribunal,251 will represent a step in that direction. 
Private party direct access, whether to arbitration or to formal adju-
dication, represents an important step in enhancing trust in the estab-
lished trade regime. The extent to which NAFTA offers this access is 
presently limited to one or two trade sectors. In this respect, the EU is 
significantly more advanced, but has also enjoyed a significantly longer 
history in which to experiment with this issue. It remains to be seen, 
however, if this difference will affect the economic success of both the 
EU and NAFTA. 
251 See Johnson, supra note 78. 
